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“Need for Alarm” 83
Randy Shilts writes in his seminal account of the
crisis, And the Band Played On, the San Francisco
Chronicle acted quite differently than its turn of the
century predecessor, and was far ahead of the national
media in both reporting the tragic deaths, and pushing
the local government for more action.  Subsequently,
San Francisco’s AIDS prevention and treatment
programs were far ahead of other cities such as New
York.57 
Perhaps then, if the Call and Chronicle in 1900-
1904 had been out in front of the local health
inspectors, reporting in detail the early gruesome
deaths in Chinatown, local and federal officials would
have responded with a unified effort, unburdened with
having to prove that a disease actually existed. 
Ironically, the scientific knowledge of the bubonic
plague in the early twentieth century was actually
more advanced than the knowledge of AIDS when its
outbreak took place in San Francisco.  But so much
effort on the part of Joseph Kinyoun and the early
health officials involved with the plague was spent on
fighting a daily press war with the Republican news
conglomerates, that two years went by with little
substantive progress.  The plague of 1900 will forever
illustrate the coercive power of the press to muddle
scientific knowledge and delay impactful action.
Guy Marzorati is a senior History major and Political
Science minor at Santa Clara University. He hopes to
pursue a career in broadcast media.
      57 Randy Shilts, And the Band Played On (Boston: St.
Martin’s Press, 1987).
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Environmental Disaster in Japan
Kathryn Karasek
Japan modernized more rapidly than any other
country in the modern era. This rapid modernization
dictated the government’s responses to environmental
issues throughout the twentieth century. In this essay,
I examine the Minamata disaster and how it
epitomized the ideology that grounded the
government’s response to environmental disaster. I
argue that, although the climax occurred in the mid-
twentieth century, the roots were planted in the
beginning of the century, with the Ashio Copper Mine
pollution incident. I further examine how the
Minamata case affected the government’s approach to
the Fukushima Nuclear Crisis.
The Ashio Copper Mine
Intensive environmental destruction in Japan,
coupled with a combative public response to that
destruction, can be traced to just before the turn of the
twentieth century, when the pollution from the Ashio
Copper Mine wreaked havoc on the surrounding
countryside and farmers rose up against their
government to save their lands. The Ashio Copper
Mine had been active since the seventeenth century,
but was losing money by the Bakumatsu period (1853-
1868). It took the mentality of the Meiji era, one
focused on modernization and productivity, to bring
the mine back to life. Little did Furukawa Ichibe, the
new owner and operator of the mine who took control
in 1877, know that he had awakened a monster.
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Furukawa Ichibe was one of the great entrepreneurial
minds of the Meiji era.1 He set out to make the Ashio
copper production competitive on the world stage.2
Progress was slow when he first began production in
1877. But, ten years later, global forces pulled Ashio
into the world market. In the late 1880s, the French
Copper Syndicate sought to eliminate copper price
fluctuation by creating a French-controlled monopoly
on the world copper supply. The syndicate approached
Furukawa to purchase his mine’s output. However,
because Furukawa acknowledged his ignorance of “the
world beyond Yokohama,” he refused to sign with the
French Copper Syndicate itself, and instead signed
with its representative firm, Jardine Matheson &
Company.3 A British company, Jardine Matheson had
a long and substantial history of mercantile activities
in East Asia.4 The French Copper Syndicate failed to
manipulate the global copper market successfully and
went bankrupt by 1889. However, Furukawa held
Jardine Matheson to the contract. As a result, Ashio
owed the British company the incredibly large amount
of copper it had promised: the contract called for
“19,000 tons of copper to be delivered over 29 months
starting in August 1888 at the fixed price of Y20.75 per
100 kin (pounds).”5
      1 F.G. Notehelfer, “Between Tradition and Modernity: Labor
and the Ashio Copper Mine,” Monumenta Nipponica, 39:1 (1984),
12
      2 Jun Ui, Industrial Pollution in Japan, (Tokyo: UN University
Press, 1992) - Ch. 1, Sec. I
      3 F.G. Notehelfer, “Japan’s First Pollution Incident,” Journal
of Japanese Studies, 1:2 (1975), 358
      4 Ui, Industrial Pollution in Japan, Ch. 1, Sec. I
      5 Notehelfer, “Japan’s First Pollution Incident,” 358
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This was the true turning point in the Ashio
environmental history. In his attempt to join the global
system, Furukawa “had contracted far in excess of his
means;” in fact, he promised almost 1.5 times the
current production at his three mine locations, two of
which were already operating at maximum capacity.
The Ashio mine had to make up the difference.
Furukawa thus began a program of “crash
modernization,” and initiated construction of a hydro-
electric plant (Japan’s first), to provide electricity for
the mine which greatly increased its production
capacity.6 Electric motors and pumps increased
production, while electric lights in the shafts allowed
workers to work more efficiently. Through these
changes, Furukawa was able to meet the demands of
his Jardine Matheson contract, a success heralded as
a “great victory for Japan” and perhaps an even greater
victory for Furukawa himself, whose company by 1891
produced 47.8% of Japan’s copper (40% coming from
Ashio itself).7
Although it cannot be denied that this rapid
modernization was an important step in proving to the
world that Japan was a competitor in the marketplace,
at what cost were these victories achieved? The answer
to this question may not have been obvious to
Furukawa, but it was painfully so to both the laborers
at Ashio and to the farmers and fishermen who lived
downstream from the mine. The intense emphasis that
Furukawa put in capital investment in the late 1800s
and early 1900s pushed the original means of
production, the miners, to a secondary position.
      6 Ibid, 359
      7 Ibid, 360-61
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Furukawa thus turned his focus away from
modernizing the labor force and towards modernizing
the technology used in the mine. This allowed the
perpetuation of a hierarchical social structure within
the mine, a structure that would prevent effective labor
organization or unionization until well into the
twentieth century, exacerbating the frustration of the
laborers.8 
By the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905-
1906, it became clear to the miners that Furukawa
prioritized his new technology over the wellbeing of his
workers. This dangerous combination of polarization
and pauperization culminated in 1907 with “the
greatest outbreak of violence in modern Japanese
labor history.”9 The Ashio riot of 1907 resulted from
neglect on the part of the mine officials, corruption
within the management structure, and the lack of an
established outlet for the frustrations of Ashio
laborers. The riot set miners against their supervisors
in a conflict that lasted until the labor disputes of
1919, when the management was restructured.10 On
a smaller scale, the 1907 riot was representative of the
societal tensions of the era, especially the pitting of big
business and management against the laborers of
whom dramatic sacrifices were demanded for the sake
of national economic development. Eventually, the
tensions built to a breaking point. This formed a
parallel with the case of the farmers dealing with the
destruction caused by the Ashio mine as well as those
      8 Notehelfer, “Between Tradition and Modernity,” 23
      9 Ibid, 24
      10 Kazuo Nimura, The Ashio Riot of 1907: A Social History of
Mining in Japan, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 153
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who suffered from Minamata Disease in the mid-
twentieth century. 
The group that suffered even more than the mine
laborers were the farmers who lived downstream from
the mine. By the late 1880s, “almost all marine life in
both rivers (the Watarase and the Tone) was dead,”
eliminating the livelihoods of thousands of fishermen.11
In addition, farmers who lived along the riverside
suffered. Because of the deforestation undertaken by
Ashio to get enough wood to keep the mine running at
maximum capacity, the watershed at the head of the
Watarase was destroyed. With the watershed gone,
flooding became a serious issue. The water that
overran the fields was not replenishing as “poisonous
silt from the mine rendered once-rich agricultural
lands a moonscape.”12 Not only was almost all
vegetation killed, but farmers who came in contact
with the water developed sores upon contact. The river
of their livelihoods had become the “River of Death.”13 
When faced with the disaster and destruction
caused by the mine runoff, the citizens appealed to
their government. These appeals were indicative of the
new political system in Japan around the turn of the
century. Appealing to the Diet, the representative and
legislative branch of government, a coalition of village
leaders submitted a formal petition in 1891 asking for
the “removal of the pollution and a temporary closure
of the Ashio Copper Mine.”14 In line with a pattern that
      11 Notehelfer, “Japan’s First Pollution Incident,” 361-62
      12 Brett L. Walker, Toxic Archipelago: A History of Industrial
Disease in Japan, (University of Washington: Weyerhaeuser
Environmental Books, 2009), 71
      13 Notehelfer, “Japan’s First Pollution Incident,” 363
      14 Ibid, 363
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would become painfully repetitive over the next
century, their petition was dismissed, and the
government denied that the mine had caused any
harm. One of the most frustrating aspects of this
dismissal was the fact that there was a specific law in
place, the Japanese Mining Law of 1892, which was
meant to protect the public interest against potential
harm caused by mines such as Ashio. It appears that
public interest was considered secondary to the more
powerful interests of profit and economic development.
With their government ignoring their requests, the
villagers were forced to deal with Furukawa and Ashio
on a private level, undertaking a system of local
settlements. These settlements were effectively
indemnity payments to keep the villagers silent for
four years, or until 1896. The agreement also included
a clause that said Furukawa would, by June of 1893,
install new equipment to prevent future pollution from
Ashio. It became apparent, however, that conditions in
the affected regions were deteriorating, not improving;
“Furukawa's promised technological improvements
were all a hoax, or, if not a hoax, then a dismal
failure.”15
One of the key variables in this conflict came to
light in 1895, when Japanese soldiers returned home
from the Sino-Japanese War. Having just fought for
their country, these soldiers were horrified to learn
that their families and communities had been treated
so unjustly while they were away at war. They came
home to increasingly high infant mortality rates and
fertility problems due to poisoning from the mine. The
livelihoods of their families had been destroyed, and
      15 Ibid, 368
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the government as a whole refused to acknowledge
their pain. The return of these soldiers brought a “new
militancy” and a renewed resolve to the region. After a
devastating flood in 1896, villagers from four affected
prefectures sent a new petition to the government
calling for the closing of the mine, and for the
reduction of taxes in the affected regions while they
recovered.16 
The government’s reaction to such activities set an
important precedent for how they would deal with
environmental issues in the future. While the public
response grew, the majority of members of government
continued to downplay the significance of the issue.
The government issued an ambiguous order that called
on the Furukawa Company to undertake preventative
construction, but it did not give specific guidelines, nor
did it establish a timeline for implementation. 
The exception to this governmental refusal to
accept responsibility for the health and safety of its
citizens was the Diet representative from Tochigi
Prefecture, Tanaka Shozo. Early on, he accused the
government of avoiding the pollution question and of
putting the mine and its profits ahead of the wellbeing
of the citizens. The government was committed “to the
type of industrialization that Ashio represented.”17
They were unable to find a balance between rapid
modernization (the desire to catch up technologically
to the major trading powers of the day), and the
remedying of collateral damage from such activities.
When their appeals to the governmental failed, the
citizens once again turned to private coercion, albeit
      16 Ibid, 368-69
      17 Ibid, 368
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with a new target. They persuaded leading politicians
to visit the affected region, and these men were “deeply
disturbed” by what they saw. Their discoveries,
coupled with the rising tide of militant activism from
the villagers, led to a governmental decision to act. In
1897, after apologizing for their prior inaction, the
government issued a new set of specific orders with
actions required by the Furukawa Company.18 Just as
Furukawa had undertaken crash modernization in the
previous decade, he was now forced to undertake a
crash program to implement the necessary changes,
changes that should have been put into affect ten
years earlier. The violence of the anti-pollution
movement slowly died down, the farms downstream
began to recover, and the problem was eclipsed by the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.
Within the context of Ashio, modernity served to
both attack and then to mend the damage in the
countryside. Although rapid technological
modernization was responsible for the pollution,
farmers were also able to use modern political
institutions—petitions, extensive research and
appeals, the court system—to remedy the situation.
This demonstrates the powerful change in mentality at
the time: not all modern institutions were out to attack
the people. Instead, citizens figured out how to fight
fire with fire. However, Ashio remains a scar on the
landscape of Japan to this day, serving as a painful
reminder of what happens when a powerful
government prioritizes profit over people, and gives the
state ultimate power over its citizens. 
      18 Ui, Industrial Pollution in Japan, Ch. 1, Sec. III
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Minamata Mercury Poisoning
The second major pollution incident of the
twentieth century, the case of Minamata mercury
poisoning, occurred almost half a century after the
Aisho mine tragedy. Many of the themes that defined
the Ashio Copper Mine incident also pervaded the
Minamata situation: government unresponsiveness,
the prioritization of profit over popular wellbeing, and
the ensuing protest on behalf of those harmed by such
decisions. 
Minamata was a small fishing and farming village
in southern Kyushu which also produced salt. When
that product, which was critical to Minimata’s
economic security, came under government monopoly,
village leaders decided to pursue other forms of
industrialization. In 1909, chemist Noguchi Jun was
looking for a site to construct a “carbide production
plant that would use surplus electricity from a hydro-
electric power plant.”19 Minamata leaders offered the
use of the land that had previously been used for salt
production, as well as use of the bay, and
infrastructural support from the local officials. At first,
working with Noguchi’s enterprise seemed to be going
well for the tiny village. It had done its part to usher in
a new era of industrialization and modernization. 
Unfortunately, the product did not sell well.
Carbide was a specialized product, and “its main use
was as a light source in night fishing.” Adapting to the
circumstances, Noguchi’s Chisso Company began
using carbide to make fertilizer. World War I gave the
company a monopoly on the chemical fertilizer
      19 Ibid, Ch. 4, Sec. I
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industry and kept the company alive. However, it was
evident that Chisso still needed to advance and adapt
if it was to maintain this competitiveness. Noguchi
traveled to Europe to explore new methods for
ammonia synthesis for fertilizer production. He was
impressed with the Haber-Bosch process, which was
a new technology even in Europe, and “was for Japan
the first experience of ammonia synthesis and the first
introduction of high-pressure gas technology.”20  The
company introduced plants in Japan and Korea and
continued to increase their competitive edge in the
marketplace. Selecting only students from the top of
their respective classes, both management and labor
were held to the highest standards. As explained by Ui
Jun, “the employment of high-quality low-paid workers
was the basis upon which Japan's industrial strength
was built.”21
With the rise of militarism in the 1930s, Chisso was
in a prime position to capitalize on their governmental
connections. By this time, Noguchi had established
himself as a military sympathizer and imperialist.22
Chisso formed its own financial conglomerate by 1933,
and remained successful by providing the military with
acetaldehyde, a key material for the petroleum
chemical industry.23 Mercury was a byproduct of this
production and was dumped, untreated, into
      20 Ibid, Ch. 4, Sec. I
      21 Ibid, Ch. 4, Sec. II
      22 Barbara Molony, Technology and Investment: The Prewar
Japanese Chemical Industry, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1990), 156 
      23 Ibid, 186
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Minamata Bay.24 
As early as 1926, fishermen in Minamata Bay
began to notice the side effects of the untreated waste
products being dumped in the water. However,
complaints were pushed aside, just as they had been
at Ashio almost thirty years earlier. In a manner
similar to the “local settlements” offered to affected
farmers at Ashio, fishermen received compensation
with the condition that they stop complaining.25 Efforts
to increase production were prioritized above the
human environment, and the government supported
company over citizen. Pollutants continued to be
dumped in Minamata Bay for the next three decades.
Although its munitions division was shut down
during the American Occupation of Japan (1945-
1952), Minamata managed to avoid the most dire
stagnation and depression following World War II by
continuing to produce fertilizer, which helped to
reestablish Japan’s agricultural production.26 Through
a strategic selection of the optimal goods to produce,
and through creativity and innovation, Chisso
“experienced a second golden era during the 1950s,”
and quickly regained its position as a monopoly
power.27
The people of Minamata managed to avoid the post-
war economic devastation that gripped most of Japan
      24 Paul Almeida and Linda Brewster Stearns, “Political
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      25 Timothy S. George, Minamata: Pollution and the Struggle
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      26 George, Minamata, 40
      27 Ui, Industrial Pollution in Japan, Ch. 4, Sec. III
10
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 18 [2013], Art. 10
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol18/iss1/10
Environmental Disaster in Japan 93
industry and kept the company alive. However, it was
evident that Chisso still needed to advance and adapt
if it was to maintain this competitiveness. Noguchi
traveled to Europe to explore new methods for
ammonia synthesis for fertilizer production. He was
impressed with the Haber-Bosch process, which was
a new technology even in Europe, and “was for Japan
the first experience of ammonia synthesis and the first
introduction of high-pressure gas technology.”20  The
company introduced plants in Japan and Korea and
continued to increase their competitive edge in the
marketplace. Selecting only students from the top of
their respective classes, both management and labor
were held to the highest standards. As explained by Ui
Jun, “the employment of high-quality low-paid workers
was the basis upon which Japan's industrial strength
was built.”21
With the rise of militarism in the 1930s, Chisso was
in a prime position to capitalize on their governmental
connections. By this time, Noguchi had established
himself as a military sympathizer and imperialist.22
Chisso formed its own financial conglomerate by 1933,
and remained successful by providing the military with
acetaldehyde, a key material for the petroleum
chemical industry.23 Mercury was a byproduct of this
production and was dumped, untreated, into
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      22 Barbara Molony, Technology and Investment: The Prewar
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University Press, 1990), 156 
      23 Ibid, 186
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until the mid-1950s, and thus felt indebted to the
Chisso plant. The majority of the village’s tax revenue
came from the company and directly related income
sources.28 The mayor of Minamata—which had grown
to become a city in 1949—and the city council
members also consisted primarily of former Chisso
managers and union members. Chisso and Minamata
had become so fully intertwined that they had
effectively become a single system. But this system
was not based on democracy, or even the wellbeing of
all of its components. Rather, it was effectively a return
to the feudal system of medieval Japan, where one
party had complete financial and political control over
the other. This internal “hierarchical social
stratification,” coupled with the external support of
Chisso by both the local and national governments,
made it structurally very difficult for the people to
assert themselves and their rights regarding their
environment.29 This pattern replicated that of the labor
force at Ashio at the turn of the century. As at Ashio,
this system led to civil unrest and a movement against
those at the top of the hierarchy. By 1955, the
situation became dire and those who ate the fish from
Minamata Bay developed a sickness that was
mysterious, debilitating, and fatal. 
The Minamata anti-pollution movement can be
broken down into distinct time periods which differed
in public action and in government response. Paul
Almeida and Linda Stearns break the struggle into four
      28 Almeida and Stearns, “The Case of Minamata,” 42
      29 Barbara Molony, review of Minamata: Pollution and the
Struggle for Democracy in Postwar Japan by Timothy S. George,
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 77:2 (2003), 460
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stages, beginning in the mid-1950s with “early efforts
to understand what was happening in Minamata.”30 
Municipal health authorities Hosokawa Hajime and
Ito Hasuo headed the initial investigation. Forming a
Strange Disease Countermeasures Committee, they
completed a house-to-house survey that revealed more
and more victims of the mysterious disease. After a
period of door-to-door surveying, the investigation
retreated to the laboratory at Kumamoto University
Medical School. When the local community realized
that heavy metal poisoning was the source of the
problem, and that this heavy metal waste likely came
from the factory, they became uncooperative. As
frightening as the disease may have been, it occurred
infrequently enough that the people were more willing
to risk a small chance of contracting the disease, than
they were willing to compromise their city’s economic
success. The company itself was even less willing to
cooperate. From providing faulty and fabricated
samples, to a disastrous human experiment in 1958
that involved “switching the discharge of the
acetaldehyde plant’s wastewater from Hyakken
Harbour to the mouth of the Minamata River,”31 it was
evident that the company suspected it was at fault but
refused to risk its profit. In fact, “testimony given in
court at a later date proved that, at the time of the
mimaikin (sympathy payment) signing, Chisso already
knew, from its own research scientists, that it was
responsible for the mercury poisoning.”32
Social action heightened in 1959 when the
      30 Timothy S. George, Minamata, 47
      31 George, Minamata, 54 
      32 Almeida and Stearns, “The Case of Minamata,” 43
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Minamata Fishermen's Association, and the Fushimi
Sea Fishermen's Association, demanded compensation
from the company for damage perpetrated by the
chemical complex.33 The company decided to pay a
small amount of sympathy money, a mimaikin, to the
affected parties, but refused to admit culpability or
change their waste disposal system.34 In response to
their inaction, fishermen held a rally demanding that
the Diet act on their behalf. In fact, “on the way home
from this rally, [the fishermen] broke into the grounds
of the chemical complex and destroyed office
equipment.”35 For their actions, many fishermen were
arrested by the prefectural police, and were
condemned by the government and the labor unions
associated with the plant.36 There was a distinct divide
between the fishermen affected by the Minamata
pollution and the laborers who depended upon it for
their livelihood. This divide reflected the pervasive
tension between profit and public interest. The
fishermen, like the farmers from Ashio, were no match
for a “powerful, cohesive elite” made up of wealthy
factory and government officials.37 
The company was able to get away with superficial
fixes, similar to those improvements promised early on
at Ashio. For example, the company installed a device
with the improbable name of “Cyclator,” that would
supposedly clean toxic waste before it was dumped
into the bay. This was a powerful public relations tool
more than it was a solution to the pollution problem,
      33 Ui, Industrial Pollution in Japan, Ch. 4, Sec. V
      34 Almeida and Stearns, “The Case of Minamata,” 43
      35 Ui, Industrial Pollution in Japan, Ch. 4, Sec. V
      36 George, Minamata, 93
      37 Almeida and Stearns, “The Case of Minamata,” 44
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especially when the company president, Yoshioka
Kiichi, pretended to drink “a glass of water from the
Cyclator in front of... assembled dignitaries, including
Governor Teramoto.”38 However, just as Furukawa did
not follow through on his promises to decrease the
pollution from Ashio, the Minamata officials were
obstinately unwilling to change their behavior. The
company lawyer later admitted that the machine was
never intended to remove organic mercury, which is
why Yoshioka did not actually drink the real waste
water from the plant. Again, it was evident that the
company knew the danger of the waste products, they
just did not care enough to clean them up.
The second period of Minamata action was one of
“expanding political opportunities.”39 Between 1964-
68, external allies began to prove integral to the cause.
A pollution case similar to that in Minamata developed
in Niigata Prefecture. The main difference was that
local officials in Niigata sided, not with the plant, but
with the victims. Unlike the Minamata case, the
Niigata plant was not integral to the local economy,
and, therefore, there was little political risk to
demanding that it cease its dangerous activities. The
Niigata officials demanded this through a lawsuit, a
tactic that Minamata victims would later adapt and
utilize in the subsequent decade. In 1971, however,
the action of the Niigata victims was radical and
unprecedented within Japan.40 It flew directly in the
face of the traditional hierarchical structures of
Japanese society. This was the last straw, and anti-
      38 George, Minamata, 115
      39 Almeida and Stearns, “The Case of Minamata,” 44
      40 George, Minamata, 174-76
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pollution activity soon rapidly increased. Workers at
Chisso noted this development and adapted, breaking
into two factions within the company labor union. One
faction, the “old” union, issued a “Shame Declaration,”
apologizing for siding with the company, instead of
with the victims of Minamata Disease.41 
The third period of action continued the
advancements made during the second period and
encompassed both external and internal action. There
were three levels of activity in this period. The first
level were the popular movements by parties external
to the Minamata destruction, such as the student
movement. The years between 1969-74 were already a
time of heightened political unrest, especially among
young people. The Vietnam War protests and
disillusionment with big government on a global level
trickled down to the environmental movement.
Students in Tokyo and students at Kumamoto
University united with locals in protesting the actions
of Chisso. 
The second level was the action taken by the
pollution victims themselves, most notably their court
victory in 1973 in conjunction with the other Big Four
pollution cases. “With the Big Four pollution cases
occurring during a widespread national anti-pollution
social movement, there was public pressure for
favorable verdicts.” Chisso was forced to publicly
acknowledge the destruction they had caused and to
pay the largest court settlement paid to citizens in
Japanese history, “a total of ¥930 million ($3.6
million).”42 
      41 Almeida and Stearns, “The Case of Minamata,” 45-46
      42 Ibid, 50
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The third and final level of action was the
government response to the popular movement. After
passing a Basic Law for Pollution Control in 1967, the
government continued to grant limited concessions to
Minamata victims, including the 1970 “Law
Concerning Relief of Pollution-related Health Damage”
and the “Compensation Law.”43 This is akin to the
stage at Ashio in which the government forced
Furukawa to clean up or shut down. The difference,
however, is that the government followed through on
their enforcement of such demands at Ashio, and
continued to support the farmers for the benefit of
agricultural stability. Sadly, in Minamata, this was not
the case.
In the fourth stage of the larger movement, the
government diverted from its path of gradually
granting more concessions to the disease victims, and
returned to its hard-line policies of the 1950s and
early 1960s. The national anti-pollution movement lost
steam with the stagnation of the economy after 1974.
Citizens no longer had the luxury of dedicating free
time to social movements, and did not press the
government to maintain their dedication to addressing
the victims’ problems. In the same way that
government officials put public wellbeing on hold to
modernize the mining industry at Ashio in order to
compete on the world market, the government
responded to the financial crisis by allying with big
business. Although the Japanese government took a
few small steps forward in the late 1960s and early
1970s, it took a big step back in terms of civil rights
      43 “Minamata Disease: The History and Measures,” The
Ministry of the Environment, (2002), Section 2
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following the oil crisis of 1973-74.
Settlements made following this economic and
political stagnation were more akin to the mimaikin of
the 1950s, as the state receded into a refusal to accept
responsibility for its failure to regulate Chisso, and for
its failure to recognize the rights of the victims of the
Minamata mercury poisoning. Lawsuits became tied
up in courts for decades, and fewer victim
certifications were granted, preventing many victims
from receiving their indemnity, and any sense of
closure that may have come with it. 
Conclusion
Overall, the legacy of Minamata was one of
incomplete victories. “Minamata does not offer a simple
answer to questions about the nature of postwar
democracy,” and the government’s responsibility to
both protect its people from public health hazards and
to ensure economic growth.44 The impacts of this
legacy began with the Ashio Copper Mine, continued in
Minamata, and extended into the twenty-first century
with the Fukushima Nuclear Crisis. 
It remains to be seen how the government will
ultimately handle the Fukushima earthquake crisis,
but many parallels with Minamata emerged
immediately following the disaster. In the same way
that Minamata officials persuaded Noguchi to
construct his plant in their village, many rural villages,
prior to the Fukushima crisis, sought to “solve their
      44 George, Minamata, 284
102 Historical Perspectives June 2013
problems by attracting nuclear power plants.”45 The
“local settlements” and mimaikin of Ashio and
Minamata were also duplicated with the offering of
payments, following the crisis, to residents and towns
near the Fukushima power plant. In addition, just as
farmers near Ashio, and fishermen near Minamata,
were among those most harmed by the pollution,
farmers in the affected area surrounding Fukushima
have seen the carelessness of technological innovators
put the health of the town at risk.46 Finally, and
perhaps most disturbingly, the governor of Tokyo,
Ishihara Shintaro, repeated the Chisso president’s
infamous publicity stunt of 1959 by drinking “a glass
of tap water on national television to prove that it was
safe from radioactive contamination.”47
Despite these parallels, there is still time for the
government’s reaction to Fukushima to turn in a more
positive direction. There is still time to learn from both
the mistakes and successes of the past. In the same
way that victims of Ashio and Minamata used modern
institutions to fight social and environmental injustice,
with an active popular response, it may be that the
pain of past disasters can be avoided with respect to
Fukushima. In conclusion, the ultimate similarity of
the Ashio, Minamata, and Fukushima cases goes
beyond environmental issues, and breaches the
problem of citizenship, democracy, social control and
      45 Timothy S. George, “Fukushima in Light of Minamata,”
The Asia Pacific Journal, 10:11, 5 (2012), online:
http://japanfocus.org/-Timothy_S_-George/3715  
      46 Christine Marran, “Contamination: From Minamata to
Fukushima,” The Asia Pacific Journal, 9:1 (2011), online:
http://japanfocus.org/-Christine-Marran/3526 
      47 George, “Fukushima in Light of Minamata,” online
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governmental power, and the value of humanity in a
world that seemingly values technology and progress
above all. It also demonstrates the continual tension
between the government’s quest and constant push for
modernity, and the forced adaptation of the citizenry
to use the government’s own weapons against them.
Kathryn Karasek is a a double major in History and
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SCU. Her paper, "Environmental Destruction in Japan",
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“These Navies and Armies and Kings
and Things”: Anglo American
Cooperation in Anti-Submarine Warfare
in World War I
Sean Naumes
The United States entered World War I, one of the
most destructive conflicts in human history, on April
6, 1917. The nation was almost completely unprepared
for armed conflict, and this was especially true of the
United States Navy which could not even fully man the
craft that it had available. America’s entry into the war
also coincided with a major allied crisis caused by the
resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by the
Germans which saw, at that time, German submarines
sinking one in every four ships that left Britain’s
harbors.1 However, within a short period of time, the
U.S.  Navy was working closely with Britain’s Royal
Navy to protect convoys and maintain the blockade of
Germany that eventually help to bring about the
armistice of 1918.Cooperation between the United
States Navy and its Royal counterpart was extremely
effective because it allowed the two powers to maintain
the lines of communication between the Allies and the
United States through the preservation of shipping
tonnage which fueled the Allied economies and war
effort. This begs the question why the cooperation
between the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy anti-submarine
      1 Michael Simpson, ed., Anglo-American Naval Relations,
1917-1918( Aldershot, Hants, England: Published by Scolar
Press for the Navy Records Society, 1991), 23.
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